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Abstract
The debate about concepts has always been shaped by a contrast between subjectivism,
which treats them as phenomena in the mind or head of individuals, and objectivism,
which insists that they exist independently of individual minds. The most prominent
contemporary version of subjectivism is Fodor’s RTM. The Fregean charge against
subjectivism is that it cannot do justice to the fact that different individuals can share
the same concepts. Proponents of RTMhave accepted shareability as a ‘non-negotiable
constraint’. At the same time they insist that by distinguishing between sign-types
and – tokens the Fregean objection cannot just be circumvented but revealed to be fal-
lacious.My paper rehabilitates the Fregean argument against subjectivism. The RTM
response rests either on an equivocation of ‘concept’—between types which satisfy the
non-negotiable constraint and tokens which are mental particulars in line with RTM
doctrine—or on the untenable idea that one and the same entity can be both a shareable
type and hence abstract and a concrete particular in the head. Furthermore, subjecti-
vism cannot be rescued by adopting unorthodox metaphysical theories about the
type/token and universal/particular contrasts. The ﬁnal section argues that concepts
are not representations or signs, but something represented by signs. Even if RTM is
right to explain conceptual thinking by reference to the occurrence of mental represen-
tations, concepts themselves cannot be identical with such representations.
Concepts have occupied a central role in philosophy ever since the
Socratic quest for deﬁnitions. But even if we abstract from merely
terminological variations, concepts have been assigned a multitude
of different and potentially conﬂicting roles. What we would nowa-
days call concepts have featured as:
† universals or properties† components of propositions† meaning(s) of linguistic expressions† psychic or neurophysiological processes† ‘modes of presentation’, ways in which we think of objects.
In spite of this diversity, one can detect a pervasive contrast between
two fundamentally opposed approaches.1 According to objectivist or
1 A.J.P. Kenny, The Metaphysics of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University
Press), 136; G. Rey, ‘Concepts’, in E. Craig (ed.), The Routledge
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logical conceptions, concepts exist independently of individual human
minds, e.g. as self-subsistent abstract entities or as abstractions from
linguistic practices. According to subjectivist or psychological con-
ceptions, concepts are mental phenomena, entities or goings-on in
the mind or in the head of individuals.
The most prominent contemporary version of subjectivism is the
representational theory of mind or ‘RTM’ championed by Fodor
and his followers. Its central claim is that concepts aremental particu-
lars. Fodor portrays his enemies as part of a wide-ranging conspiracy,
which includes Ryle, Wittgenstein, neo-Fregeans, conceptual or
inferential role semanticists, and holists of various sorts. He labels
this conspiracy ‘pragmatism’, because it links concepts to inferential
rules and abilities rather than to inner goings-on. And he has
pronounced pragmatism to be ‘the deﬁning catastrophe of analytic
philosophy of language and philosophy of mind in the second half
of the twentieth century’.2
Many aspects of the Manichean struggle between RTM and prag-
matism have been discussed in recent literature.3My paper is devoted
instead to a conﬂict which pits not just RTM against ‘pragmatism’,
but subjectivism as such against any form of objectivism, including
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1998) Vol. 2, 505;
S. Laurence and E. Margolis, ‘The Ontology of Concepts: Are Concepts
Abstract Objects or Mental Representations?’, Nouˆs 41 (2007), 561.
2 Quoted in T. Crane, ‘Something Else, Surely’, Times Literary
Supplement (7.05.2004), 4. See: J. Fodor, Hume Variations (Oxford:
Oxford University Press), 9 and ‘Having Concepts: A Brief Refutation of
the Twentieth Century’, Mind and Language 19 (2004), 29–47. In this
last article, he uses the less misleading label ‘concept pragmatism’ to cover
all ‘epistemic’ accounts that treat concept possession as a kind of knowledge,
including those which invoke knowing that rather than knowing how. But
even in that article he does nothing to dispel the impression that RTM
and pragmatism exclude one another. This is misleading, since one can be
a representationalist while subscribing to conceptual role semantics.
3 See Volume 19.1 ofMind and Language (2004). Responding to Fodor,
‘Having Concepts . . .’, op. cit. note 2, Weiskopf and Bechtel reject his alle-
gation that pragmatism cannot avoid circularity in its account of concept
possession, Prinz and Clark defend the pragmatist link between conceptual
thought and action, Rey deplores his wholesale rejection of the ‘Twentieth
Century’ on the grounds that it leads to a ﬁrst-person meaning mysticism,
and Peacocke insists that epistemic accounts of concepts are not committed
to unacceptable consequences like making thought interpretation-dependent.
Fodor gets the last word in ‘Reply to Commentators’,Mind and Language 19
(2004), 99–112.
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Platonist accounts deriving from Frege. And it concerns not the issue
of concept-possession, which has tended to occupy centre-stage in
recent debates, but concepts themselves: Can RTM, as a version of
subjectivism, account for the shareability of concepts?
For RTM, ‘the mind is pre-eminently the locus of mental rep-
resentation and mental causation’.4 It is a ‘representational system’,
and thinking is ‘representing things in the world’.5 So-called prop-
ositional attitudes like belief and desire are mental states, and they
‘are constituted by relations to mental representations’. Furthermore,
‘mental processes consist of causal interactions among these inter-
related states and entities’; they are ‘causal chains in which each link
is sufﬁcient for its successor’. ‘The constituents of mental processes
are causal interactions among . . . ideas’.6
As regards concepts, the central thesis of RTM is that they are
‘mental objects’. They constitute a kind of ‘mental representation’
and hence a ‘kind of mental particular’. As mental particulars, they
are ‘objects in the mind’ or ‘in the head’ of individuals; they are ‘con-
crete’ rather than abstract; and they have causes and effects in the
physical world.7 As mental representations, they have ‘represen-
tational content’. They occur as part of propositional attitudes, and
what they represent contributes to the content of these attitudes, to
what we believe, desire, etc. They do so by determining the con-
ditions under which the attitudes in which they occur are true (in
the case of beliefs) or satisﬁed (in the case of desires).
At present it is often assumed that the conﬂict between Fregean
objectivists and representationalists simply rests on two diverse con-
ceptions of concepts, serving different yet compatible interests. On
the one hand, logicians, formal semanticists and conceptual analysts
require a notion of concepts that makes them independent of individ-
ual people (whether it be as Fregean modes of presentation, sets of
real or possible objects, functions on such entities, or as abstractions
from intersubjective linguistic practices). On the other hand, psy-
chologists, philosophers of mind and members of the artiﬁcial intel-
ligentsia need a notion of concepts which captures the mental or
neural processes of individual speakers or thinkers.8
4 Fodor, Hume Variations, op. cit. note 2, 8; see 7–10.
5 Crane, op. cit. note 2.
6 Fodor, Hume Variations, op. cit. note 2, 8n, 141, 10.
7 Fodor, Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong (Oxford:
Oxford University Press), 3, 7–8, 22; Fodor, Hume Variations, op. cit.
note 2, 13 þ n; Crane, op. cit. note 2.
8 E.g, Rey, op. cit. note 1.
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As we shall see, this conciliatory picture of the situation is too san-
guine.9 On the one hand, any claim according to which concepts are
phenomena in the minds of individuals faces an objectivist objection
associated with Frege: concepts cannot be mental particulars since
they can be shared between different individuals. On the other
hand, some proponents of RTM, Fodor pre-eminent among them,
not only regard their subjectivist approach as a superior research pro-
gramme, but entirely dismiss the objectivist alternative. Thus Fodor
lists the claim that concepts are mental particulars (i.e. mental causes
and effects) as one of ﬁve ‘not-negotiable conditions on a theory of
concepts’.10 Furthermore, like several other proponents of RTM he
holds that the Fregean objection is fallacious, since it ignores the
difference between type- and token-representations or -signs.
My ﬁrst section introduces the Fregean argument and the RTM
response. In the second section I show that this response misconstrues
the Fregean argument, and that it ultimately rests either on an equivo-
cation or on the untenable idea that one and the same entity can be both
a shareable type and hence an abstract universal and a concrete mental
particular. This absolves Frege of the charge of having committed a
gross fallacy. But section 3 considers the further question of whether
RTM might be protected from the Fregean argument by adopting
unorthodox metaphysical theories about the contrasts between type
and token and between universals and particulars. I deny this: the the-
ories at issue are not just problematic in their own right, they also run
counter to both the letter and the spirit of RTM. In the ﬁnal section
I argue that even by RTM’s own lights concepts can be neither type-
nor token-signs, instead they must be something signiﬁed by signs.
In other words, concepts are not symbolic representations but some-
thing represented by symbols.
1. The Shareability of Concepts
Frege uses the term ‘idea’ [Vorstellung] to signify what RTM calls a
mental particular. Frege’s ideas include sensations, but they also
9 On this point I agree with Sutton (‘Are Concepts Mental
Representations or Abstracta?’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
68 (2004), 89–93) and Margolis/Laurence (op. cit. note 1, 589 n. 10. But
whereas they opt for subjectivism (alias RTM or mentalism), I defend
Frege’s objectivist argument concerning shareability. Unlike Fodor,
Laurence and Margolis, however, Sutton does not reject the Fregean argu-
ment as fallacious, and his position is compatible with it. See fn. 27.
10 Op. cit. note 7, 22.
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include mental representations. Such an idea is capable of represent-
ing objects that are objective; yet the idea itself is subjective, i.e. ‘some-
thing that belongs to the mental life of an individual’ and is ‘quite as
private to the individual as his pleasure or pain’. Concepts, by con-
trast, are objective: they ‘confront everyone in the same way’.11
Most importantly, concepts can be shared between different individ-
uals, whereas ideas cannot.
One should never forget that the ideas of different people,
however similar theymay be—something which cannot, inciden-
tally, be exactly determined—do not coincide but are to be distin-
guished. Each has his own ideas, which are not those of another.
Here, of course, I understand ‘idea’ in the psychological sense.
The vacillating use of this word causes confusion and helps the
psychological logicians to conceal their failings. When will an
end be put to this once and for all? Everything is eventually
dragged into the realm of psychology; the boundary between
the objective and the subjective disappears more and more, and
even actual [wirkliche] objects are treated psychologically as
ideas.12
For Frege13 a concept is the ‘referent’ (Bedeutung) rather than the
‘sense’ of a ‘concept-word’ or predicate; and it is ‘senses’ rather
than concepts that are components of propositions (Gedanken). His
most explicit statement on shareability contrasts ideas not with con-
cepts themselves, but with these senses. There is an ‘essential distinc-
tion’ between the ‘subjective’ idea associated with a sign and its
‘sense, which may be the common property of many people, and so
is not a part or a mode of the individual mind’. Different people
‘are not prevented from grasping the same sense, but they cannot
have the same idea’.14
It is important to note that Frege’s argument from the unshareabil-
ity of ideas does not hinge on his tentative and highly problematic
claim that the ideas of different individuals cannot be compared.15
11 G. Frege, Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Vol. 1 (Jena: Phole, 1893),
XVIII; see Grundlagen der Arithmetik; English translation The
Foundations of Arithmetic (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), X; ‘Der Gedanke’, in
M. Beaney (ed.),The Frege Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), original pagi-
nation 66–7.
12 Frege, Grundgesetze. . ., op. cit. note 11, XVIII–XIX.
13 ‘Letter to Husserl 24.5.1891’, in Beaney, op. cit. note 11, 149.
14 G. Frege, ‘U¨ber Sinn und Bedeutung’, in Beaney, op. cit. note 11,
original pagination 29–30.
15 Cp. Laurence and Margolis, op. cit. note 1, 567.
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Even if we can establish thatA and B both have mental images of the
Eiffel Tower, these images will still be situated in different minds and
hence be numerically distinct. Fregean ideas are unshareable by deﬁ-
nition: an idea in the mind ofAmust be numerically distinct from one
in the mind ofB. But this does not settle the question of whether one
can compare these ideas for their qualitative identity or difference,
notably on the basis of how A and B describe their respective
mental images.
What about the things that Frege regards as shareable? The sense of
an expression is the ‘mode of presentation’ of its referent. Roughly
speaking, the sense of a sentence is the thought expressed by it; the
sense of a proper name is the features which determine what object,
if any, is the referent of the name; the sense of a concept-word is
the features which determine what objects, if any, fall under the
concept-word.
Proponents of RTM often disregard Frege’s distinction between
senses or ‘modes of presentations’ on the one hand and concepts on
the other. At least in the current context, however, this inaccuracy
does not matter. Frege himself occasionally used ‘concept’ for the
sense of concept-words.16 Contemporary neo-Fregeans like Peacocke
and Ku¨nne adopt this line, and for good reasons. Our preconception
of concepts distinguishes, for instance, not just the concept of a
cordate from that of a renate, but also the concept of an equiangular
triangle from that of an equilateral triangle. In otherwords, we individ-
uate concepts not just more ﬁnely than Fregean referents (extensions)
but also than properties or intensions, and just as ﬁnely as Fregean
senses (which are shared by predicates only if the latter are synon-
ymous). Most importantly, Frege’s point about the shareability of
senses extends directly to concepts; and this extension is very much
part of his frequent insistence on the objectivity of concepts.
According to Frege, the shareability of senses/concepts can be guaran-
teed only by treating them as abstract entities, entities which are what
Frege calls ‘non-actual’ (by contrast to material objects) yet ‘objective’
(by contrast to mental phenomena like ideas).
Shareability17 is a feature of the ordinary concept of a concept in
both everyday life and in disciplines like psychology and the
history of ideas. One central use we make of ‘concept’ and terms
16 Posthumous Writings (Oxford: Blackwell), 253; ‘Die Verneinung’, in
Beaney, op. cit. note 11, original pagination 151.
17 This term is preferable to Fodor’s ‘publicity’: my nose is public in the
sense of being accessible tomore than one observer; but I am relieved to state
that I do not share it with anyone.
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that are equivalent in the relevant contexts (like ‘conception’, ‘idea’ or
‘notion’) is in claims about different individuals or even groups of
individuals either sharing a concept, or failing to do so. For instance,
different political and religious traditions may or may not share con-
cepts like those of freedom of religion and of freedom of speech. Such
claims are equally central to intellectual history, e.g. when it comes to
comparing the Greek concept of eudaimonia with our concept of
happiness.
Appeals to established use outside of cognitive science would nor-
mally be given short shrift by supporters of RTM. Yet even Fodor
accepts as another one of his ‘not-negotiable conditions on a theory
of concepts’ that ‘concepts are public; they’re the sorts of things that
lots of people can, and do, share’.18 At the same time, he thinks
that he can easily account for shareability by introducing a distinction
between type and token.
Peirce had introduced this well-known distinction for signs.19 In
recent philosophy of mind it has been liberally extended beyond its
semiotic roots to cover the difference between kinds of mental
states and events on the one hand, and individual instances of these
kinds on the other. For example, there is the ‘type’ believing
that-dogs-bark and its so-called ‘tokens’, i.e. individual instances
such as Anne’s believing that-dogs-bark. In my view, this extension
is problematic.20 Even if justiﬁed, however, such qualms need not
affect Fodor’s version of RTM.His ‘language of thought hypothesis’
treats mental representations as symbols and consequently invites
the semiotic distinction that Peirce himself introduced. Fodor main-
tains that both themeaning of public languages and the intentionality
of thought can be explained by a ‘language of thought’.21 External
sentences are meaningful because they are correlated with internal
signs, sentence-like representations in the brain the tokening of
which constitutes our thinking (believing, desiring, etc.). The ulti-
mate carriers of intentional content are sentences in ‘Mentalese’,
18 Concepts, op. cit. note 7, 28.
19 C.S. Peirce, The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vol. II
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
20 In both cases we have a repeatable entity and a non-repeatable entity.
But the relation between believing that p and Anne’s believing that p at time
t is that between a (universal) property and a particularised instance of that
property (a trope), whereas the relation between a type-word and a particular
occurrence of it appears to be closer to that between a universal property and
the concrete object that instantiates it, which in our example would be Anne
herself.
21 The Language of Thought (New York: Crowell).
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physical tokens of computational types. When we engage in concep-
tual thought, Mother Nature inscribes words of a computer pro-
gramme into our brains. Concepts, according to Fodor, are nothing
other than the token-words of the language of thought:
. . . the mental particular that’s in your head on occasions when
you think dog is a token of the concept type DOG, just as the
word that’s on your lips when you say “dog” is a token of the
word type “dog”. In both cases, the tokens are concrete particu-
lars and the types are abstracta. Likewise, the mental particular
that’s in your head when you think that ( judge that) dogs bark
is a token of the mental representation type DOGS BARK.22
This explains the shareability of concepts by distinguishing between
type and token.
Since, according to RTM, concepts are symbols, they are pre-
sumed to satisfy a type/token relation; to say that two people
share a concept (i.e. that they have literally the same concept),
is thus to say that they have tokens of literally the same concept.23
Consider the scenario in which Anne and Sarah both believe that dogs
bark and (improbably) utter ‘Dogs bark’ in close succession. In that
case we are dealing with two tokens of a single type-sentence ‘Dogs
bark’, and two tokens of a single type-word ‘bark’. Similarly, accord-
ing to Fodor, in Anne’s brain there occurs one neural token-sentence,
and in Sarah’s brain there occurs another neural token-sentence. Yet
Anne and Sarah both believe the same thing, namely that dogs bark,
since both tokens instantiate the same Mentalese type-sentence
DOGS BARK. Finally, they share the concept DOG, because both
have tokens of one and the sameMentalese type-word.
2. RTM vs. Frege
This position can account for shareability. It does so at a price,
however. The type/token distinction cannot be used to invalidate
Frege’s argument, since it implies abandoning the claim that con-
cepts themselves are particulars. After all, what can be shared
between different individuals are representation-types; and these
types, as Fodor duly acknowledges, are ‘abstracta’ rather than
mental particulars. To bemore precise, types are repeatable universals
22 HumeVariations, op. cit. note 2, 13n; seeConcepts. . . op. cit. note 7, 3n.
23 Concepts, op. cit. note 7, 28.
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and hence abstract.24 Conversely, what can qualify as mental particu-
lars are representation-tokens; and these tokens are conﬁned to each
individual rather than shareable. This leaves RTM in a perilous
position.
On the one hand, the non-negotiable constraint on a theory of con-
cepts, namely that concepts be shareable,
 is satisﬁed only by the abstract types
 which are neither particulars (mental, physical or otherwise)
nor concrete.
On the other hand, the central claim of RTM, namely that concepts
are concrete particulars,
 applies only to the tokens
 which are not shareable.
At issue between RTMand objectivism is notwhether concepts allow
of a type/token distinction.25 It is whether concepts, the things which
can be shared between different subjects, could bemental particulars,
that is, tokens rather than types. As far as the Fregean objection is con-
cerned, proponents of RTM are perfectly entitled to postulate a
language of thought involving the tokening of sign-types. Still, if
they persistently kept apart types and tokens, they would be forced
to abandon the central claim of RTM, namely that concepts are
mental particulars that can enter into causal relations. Instead they
would have to acknowledge that concepts themselves are not particu-
lars. This would still allow them to insist that conceptual thinking
consists in the tokening of shareable types and hence in the occur-
rence of particulars.26 They would remain free to explain what goes
24 In a passage quoted below Fodor seems to adopt the orthodox dis-
tinction between particulars and universals. But in the last but one quotation
and in his explanations of what it is for concepts to be mental particulars
(quoted in my introduction) he contrasts particulars with abstracta, insisting
that they are in the head and stand in causal relations. This inaccuracy does
not matter for our purposes. For all universals are abstract (barring unortho-
dox views like that of Armstrong discussed in section 3). In any event, the
contrast at the centre of the controversy between RTM and Frege is that
between a particular conﬁned to individual subjects and something
shareable.
25 Pace Sutton, op. cit. note 9; Laurence and Margolis, op. cit. note 1,
567–9.
26 Something akin to this fall-back position is adopted by Davis
(Nondescriptive Meaning and Reference (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005)) and Sutton (op. cit. note 9, 92–4, 103). The latter explicitly concedes
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on in the head of thinkers by reference to mental particulars. But they
would not remain free to maintain that concepts, the things which by
common consent must be shareable between different thinkers, are
those mental particulars.
Unfortunately, many advocates of RTM resist any such conces-
sion. Rather than granting that the Fregean argument necessitates a
substantial modiﬁcation of RTM, from a doctrine about concepts
to one about the tokening of concepts in thought, these inveterate
subjectivists dismiss the argument. Thus Margolis and Laurence
describe it as ‘especially disappointing’:
Frege is certainly right that each person has her own unique
mental representation tokens, but the question is whether differ-
ent tokens in different minds can be of the same type, and we see
no reason why they can’t be. The situation is, in principle, no
different than it would be had Frege argued that two people
can’t literally utter the same sentence. While it’s true that each
will produce her own token, that doesn’t mean that the utterances
can’t be instances of the same sentence type. . . . .27
Margolis and Laurence accuse Frege of a ‘type–token confusion’.28
This label is deﬁnitely misleading, since Frege never considered con-
cepts in terms of a type/token distinction for mental representations,
the Fregean claim that subjects are related to abstract types, while insisting
that they can do so only through the occurrence of concrete tokens. Contrast
whatMargolis andLaurence call ‘themixed view’, a position they eventually
reject as insufﬁciently subjectivist (op. cit. note 1, 569, 579–81). It is based
on rejecting rather than accommodating the Fregean argument, and hence
identiﬁes concepts with mental particulars, while conceding that the latter
are typed in terms of Fregean senses.
27 Laurence and Margolis, op. cit. note 1, 567; my emphasis.
28 They extend this charge to a Fregean argument by Peacocke
(‘Rationale and Maxims in the Study of Concepts’, Nouˆs 39 (2005),
167–78) according to which the subjectivist equation of concepts with
mental representations fails since there are concepts but not mental rep-
resentations that will never be acquired by a subject. The response I give
on Frege’s behalf can be adapted to defend Peacocke: if concepts are to
exist independently of subjects they must be types rather than tokens, and
hence cannot be mental particulars. However, while all parties to the
debate rightly assume that concepts can be shared, it is more controversial
to maintain that concepts can exist even if they are never employed by a
subject of conceptual thought. For what it is worth, I reject this claim
while accepting an analogous claim about properties.
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distinguishing instead between mental ideas and abstract senses. The
real question is whether introducing the distinction permits subjecti-
vists to insist, against Frege’s objection, that concepts are mental
representations and hence subjective particulars after all. The
answer is No!
As Laurence andMargolis concede, tokens are unique to each indi-
vidual. A token in A’s head must be numerically distinct from a token
in B’s head. Consequently A and B cannot share the same token. But
then, since concepts themselves are shareable, they cannot be identi-
calwith such tokens. By contrast to tokens, types of mental represen-
tations are shareable alright; and for this reason they are candidates
for being concepts. Yet they are (abstract) universals rather than (con-
crete) particulars in the heads of individuals, which is just what objec-
tivists have been claiming. Frege is not guilty of confusing type and
token. Rather, Laurence and Margolis run together a claim that
holds for the tokens postulated by RTM, namely that they are
mental particulars, with a claim that holds for the types to which
these tokens belong, namely that they are shareable.
Elsewhere, Laurence and Margolis write: ‘mental representations
are subjective in that their tokens are uniquely possessed; they
belong to one and only one subject. Their being subjective in this
sense, however, doesn’t preclude their being shareable in the relevant
sense, since, . . ., two people can have the same representation by each
having tokens of the same type’.29 This does not furnish the riposte to
Frege which they seek, however. For it concedes that concepts are not
subjective in the straightforward sense in which he denied them to be,
namely of being uniquely possessed by individuals. That tokens of
concepts can be unique to individuals does not mean that concepts
themselves can be. Worse still, the passage does not rehabilitate sub-
jectivism. The ‘mental representations’ of which it speaks cannot be
mental particulars, since they have to be abstract universals capable of
being tokened in different subjects.
Unlike Laurence and Margolis, Fodor explicitly stresses that sign-
types are abstracta. This concession willy-nilly carries over to con-
cepts, since for him people ‘have literally the same concept’ in that
they have ‘tokens of literally the same concept’.30 Nevertheless
Fodor tries to have his cake and eat it too. His argument is phrased
mainly in terms of ‘MOPs’ or modes of presentation. But it is the
29 S. Laurence and E. Margolis, ‘Concepts and Cognitive Science’, in
Concepts: Core Readings (Cambridge, Mass.: Bradford Books/MIT
Press), 7.
30 Fodor, Concepts. . .op. cit. note 7, 28; my emphasis.
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conclusions Frege draws from the publicity of concepts that Fodor is
explicitly addressing here.
[Frege] thinks, quite wrongly that if MOPs are mental then con-
cepts won’t turn out to be public. . . . (perhaps this goes without
saying), to claim thatMOPs must bemental objects is quite com-
patible with also claiming that they are abstract objects, and that
abstract objects are not mental. The apparent tension is recon-
ciled by taking MOPS-qua-things-in-the-head to be the tokens
of which MOPS-qua-abstract-objects are the types. It seems
that Frege thought that if meanings can be shared it somehow
follows that they can’t also be particulars. But it beats me why
he thought so. You might as well argue from ‘being a vertebrate
is a universal’ to ‘spines aren’t things’.31
According to Fodor, Frege’s argument fails because MOPs/concepts
‘qua’ mental particulars can be tokens, while ‘qua’ abstract objects
they can be types. But this rebuttal suffers from precisely the kind
of vacillation Frege diagnosed in his psychologistic opponents.
The qua-operator that Fodor relies on is notoriously slippery.32
On one understanding it means in the capacity of, and ascribes two
distinct roles to a single entity. For instance, qua environmentalist
I welcome wind-farms whereas qua rambler I do not. On
another understanding, ‘qua’ means in the sense of and functions as
a tool of disambiguation. For instance, belief qua mental state or
attitude –sometimes called a believing—differs from belief qua
what is believed —the so-called (propositional) content.
31 Concepts. . .op. cit. note 7, 20–1. This passage disregards the fact that
for Frege a concept is not the sense or mode of presentation expressed by a
predicate. As mentioned above, this does not matter in the present context.
The underlying question is whether whatever distinguishes co-extensional
predicates and determines the contents of propositional attitudes is ‘ipso
facto in the head’ as Fodor contends (1998: 15). Prima faciemore threatening
to my reading of Fodor’s passage is the fact that it identiﬁes a concept not
with an MOP simpliciter, but with ‘an MOP together with a content’.
Nevertheless the passage directly concerns the shareability of concepts.
Contents are ipso facto shareable by Fodor’s lights; his task is therefore to
show against Frege that MOPs are as well, in spite of being mental rather
than abstract.
32 Frege already complained that psychologistic logicians exploit such
fudge-operators in order to defuse the absurd consequences of their
claims: ‘This “as such” is an excellent invention of authors who want to
say neither yeah nor nay. But I do not brook such oscillation between the
two, . . .’ (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, op. cit. note 11, XXIII–XXIV).
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Adopting this second understanding of ‘qua’, we must distinguish
between two kinds of things signiﬁed by ‘MOP’ or ‘concept’—
namely a mental particular on the one hand, an abstract entity on
the other. This would mean, however, that Fodor’s dismissal of the
Fregean argument is based on equivocation. The Fregean claims
that MOPs/concepts must be shareable and hence cannot be
mental particulars; Fodor denies this by surreptitiously switching
from one signiﬁcation of ‘MOP’ or ‘concept’—a type, which is an
abstract universal—to another—a token, which is a concrete
particular.
On the ﬁrst understanding of ‘qua’, Fodor postulates a single entity
which can fulﬁl different roles. Even in Fodor’s own theory, however,
there is no single entity which in one capacity is an abstract type and in
another capacity a token, a mental particular that is non-abstract.
Rather, there are two: the type which is abstract yet non-mental,
and the token which instantiates the type and which is mental yet
non-abstract. This is no coincidence, moreover, since no single
entity could have the dual capacities that Fodor requires. If x qua/in
its capacity as (an) S is F and qua/in its capacity as T is G, then it
must be possible for x to be both (an) S and (a) T. Thus one and the
same person can be both an environmentalist and a rambler. But
nothing can be both abstract and a particular in Fodor’s sense, since
such a particular has a spatio-temporal location and stands in causal
relations.
It might seem that I have been uncharitable to the inveterate sub-
jectivists. Although they often express themselves in an awkward
fashion, all they mean is this: there are token concepts, which are
unshareable; but they are tokens of types of concepts that are share-
able, just as different tokens of the Union Jack share one and the
same design. This response would be adequate if the aim were to
accommodate Frege’s point by distinguishing between shareable con-
cepts and their physical tokens. In fact, however, inveterate subjecti-
vists reject Frege’s argument as fallacious. Thus Fodor’s uncharitable
diagnosis of the Fregean argument runs as follows: the Fregean
reasons from ‘types are abstract’ to ‘tokens are not particulars’,
which is just as fallacious as reasoning from ‘properties are universal’
to ‘instances of properties are not particulars’. But the Fregean is not
guilty of any such howler. His argument simply relies on the differ-
ence between two kinds of entity: the type or property, which is
abstract or universal, and the token or instance of the property,
which is not. Acknowledging the difference between abstract types
and their physical tokens is perfectly compatible both with the man-
datory recognition that the two kinds of entity are connected andwith
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the plausible (though by no means truistic) claim that a type owes its
existence to the existence of tokens that share a certain role or function
(mutatis mutandis for universals and particulars).
The insistence that concepts are both shareable and particular faces
an intolerable dilemma. Either it commits a fallacy of equivocation by
reasoning roughly as follows:
P1 Concepts (in the sense of types) are shareable.
P2 Concepts (in the sense of tokens) are particulars.
C1 Concepts are shareable particulars.33
Or it conjures up a chimerical amalgamation, somewe-know-not-what
which combines the useful property of being a universal and hence
shareable or repeatable with the agreeable property of being a particu-
lar and hence in line with RTM doctrine.
3. Metaphysical Escape Routes
I do not see how the rebuttals of the Fregean argument that one ﬁnds
in Fodor, Laurence and Margolis can be absolved from the charge of
either committing an equivocation or invoking a category mongrel.
But perhaps the Fregean argument can be blocked after all by mod-
ifying these rebuttals. There are various options here, and some of
them raise issues that are hotly debated in contemporary metaphysics
and which I cannot fully address in this context. Nevertheless I shall
make out a case that these options are unviable because they are unat-
tractive and incompatible with RTM.
33 Fodor cannot turn the tables on the Fregean by accusing her of the
following equivocation: First Premise: Concepts (in the sense of types) are
shareable; Second Premise: Mental particulars are not shareable;
Conclusion: Concepts (in the sense of tokens) are not mental particulars.
For neither the First Premise nor the Conclusion feature in her argument.
The Fregean is not advancing any claims about concepts qua tokens or
types. Rather, she accepts that concepts—the things with which we credit
people in ascriptions of propositional attitudes and in intentional expla-
nations–must be shareable–in line with Fodor’s own professions. From this
in conjunction with the Second Premise she validly infers that concepts (i.e.
the aforementioned things which can be assumed to be shareable) are not par-
ticulars. At most one could reciprocate the charge of equivocation if the non-
negotiable constraint on concepts (the things with which we credit people,
etc.) included that they are particulars. As mentioned above, this is what
Fodor suggests in chapter 2 of Concepts. . .op. cit. note 7. But he does not
use this constraint as a premise in criticizing objectivism; advisedly so, since
such a line of reasoning would be blatantly question-begging.
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Inveterate subjectivists could respond to the Fregean argument by
avoiding the concession that the physical tokens of the language of
thought are not shareable. At ﬁrst sight this may seem attractive.
The tokens of a public language can be shared, at least if they are
inscriptions. For instance, two different demonstrators can hold up
a single placard together.
The trouble is that this possibility does not extend to the tokens
postulated by RTM, which are supposed to be phenomena in the
mind or brain of an individual. What can be shared between different
subjects of thought is not such a token but only a type—no matter
whether a type is identiﬁed in typographic terms, as in public
languages, or in the computational-syntactic terms that individuate
the types of Fodor’s postulated language of thought. With a bit of
help from science-ﬁction one can conceive of a scenario in which
two Siamese twins share neural ﬁrings. But this is out of the question
for the standard cases in which, by common consent, concepts are
shared nonetheless. When Anne and Sarah both think that dogs
bark, what they have in common (granting the language of thought
hypothesis) is the occurrence of tokens of the same type; they share
the type DOG, and the property of having tokens of that type, but
they do not share the tokens. Finally, returning to the analogy
Fodor mistakenly invokes against Frege, what two spines share is
the universal of being a vertebra, they do not share a speciﬁc instance
of being a vertebra or being a speciﬁc instance of the property of being
a vertebra.
But couldn’t an inveterate subjectivist question the notion of share-
ability and sharing which I invoked against Fodor, Lawrence and
Margolis? One might deﬁne shareability as follows: a representation-
token x is shareable iff x belongs to a representation-typewhich can be
instantiated by many different tokens. On that understanding, the
tokens themselves are the entities which can fulﬁl the dual require-
ments of being both particulars and shareable. But this gambit
relies on an ignoratio elenchi. The Fregean pointed out that in the
literal and straightforward sense concepts (representation-types)
can and mental particulars (representation-tokens) cannot be
shared, in that the former can and the latter cannot be possessed by
two different individuals. This would sufﬁce to show that concepts
are not mental particulars, even if one could fashion a different
notion of sharing which applies to both types and tokens. In fact,
however, the notion of sharing and shareability now invoked by the
inveterate subjectivist applies exclusively to the tokens. For the
concept type is obviously not shareable in the sense of being a token
of a type that can be variously instantiated.
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That Sarah and Anne share a token in the artiﬁcial sense introduced
by the inveterate subjectivist simply means that they have different
tokens of the same type. Once more, what is the same between them
concerns an abstract universal rather than amental particular; therefore
only the former, not the latter, is a candidate for being the concept
which, ex hypothesis, they both possess. Consider the following
analogy. It is perfectly legitimate to maintain that at this very
moment two spatially remote individuals Anne and Sarah ride the
same bicycle. But what one means is that their numerically distinct
bicycles are of the same type. Glossing this fact by saying that they
‘ride the same individual bicycle’ and fending off inevitable protests
by stipulating this to mean that their different bikes belong to the
same type is at best a confusing verbal manoeuvre.
Neither equivocation, nor the idea of a type/token mongrel, nor the
insistence that mental tokens can be shared is viable. One might accept
this verdict, while trying to preserve the naturalistic-cum-physicalist
aspirations that underlie RTM’s resistance to the Fregean argument.
Why not grant that shareable concepts would have to be types rather
than tokens, while insisting that types no less than tokens can have
spatio-temporal location and stand in causal relations? A precedent
might be provided by Armstrong’s suggestion that universals are
‘wholly present’ in each particular that instantiates them and hence
located in space and time.34 If we apply this idea to our present
topic, the following suggestion emerges: Rather than sharing a
token, Anne and Sarah share a type which is nonetheless wholly
located in their respective minds or brains.
There are strong arguments against the idea that a universalU can
be wholly present in two distinct and spatio-temporally separate par-
ticulars x1 and x2. In that caseU would have to be located where x1 is
and located where x2 is. But since having the same spatio-temporal
location is a transitive relation, this implies that x1 and x2 have the
same spatio-temporal location.35 Furthermore, if the universal of
being red were wholly present in a particular tomato, it could be
destroyed by painting that tomato green. Unlike the previous conse-
quence, this is not a contradiction; yet it is still absurd.36
34 D.M. Armstrong,Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1989).
35 E.J. Lowe, The Possibility of Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1998), 156.
36 Even if sound, these remarks do not constitute a deﬁnitive refutation
of Armstrong’s theory of universals. For Armstrong himself wavers on
the question of whether universals can really be located in space and time.
20
Hans-Johann Glock
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819109000011
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 09:58:20, subject to the Cambridge Core
Both of these unpalatable consequences carry over directly to the
suggestion that a type is wholly present in each of its tokens.
Furthermore, invoking this variant of Armstrong’s position is incom-
patible with the trajectory of RTM. Admittedly, it preserves the
naturalistic assumption that concepts should be part of the causal
order. But for RTM this assumption is intimately tied to the idea
that concepts are mental particulars rather than universals that
somehow manage to be concrete (and for good reasons, in light of
the previous paragraph). Thus Fodor alleges that the failure to
admit ‘concrete particulars’ in the mind is the original sin which pre-
vents ‘pragmatists’ from doing justice to mental causation.37
We are now in a position to sharpen the Fregean objection to sub-
jectivism. The constraint on concepts that RTM accepts fuels an
argument the conclusion of which is the very opposite of what
RTM claims:
P3 Concepts must satisfy the non-negotiable constraints on con-
cepts (the constraints that have to be respected by a theory of
concepts), including that they be shareable.
P4 Mental particulars cannot satisfy one of these constraints,
since they are not shareable.
C2 Concepts are not mental particulars.
Put differently, Fodor’s contested ‘constraint’ that concepts be
mental particulars is incompatible with the constraint which he
shares with his objectivist opponents, namely that concepts be share-
able. As we have seen, even the appeal to unorthodox metaphysical
views does not provide grounds for condemning the Fregean argu-
ment as invalid. But the argument might still be unsound. Perhaps
Fodor was precipitate in embracing shareability as a non-negotiable
constraint. As we have seen, he accepts that different individuals
like Anne and Sarah ‘share a concept’ in that they ‘have literally the
same concepts’, which means that they have ‘tokens of literally the
On occasion he suggests instead that they constitute space and time by being
constituents of states of affairs, with space-time being the conjunction of all
states of affairs (Universals. . .op. cit. note 36, 98–9). I shall not assess this
proposal, since it does not lend succour to the idea that concepts might be
types and nonetheless concrete occurrences in the heads of individuals.
My aim was merely to show that the rejection of the Fregean argument
cannot be based on a literal interpretation of Armstrong’s text.
37 Hume Variations, op. cit. note 2, 136–142.
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same concept’. This gives the game away, since it explicitly contrasts
the concept itself with the particulars that are its tokens.
Onemight hold instead that Anne and Sarah can entertain the same
thought not because they share a single concept DOG (which could
not be a particular), but because they merely have distinct (particular)
concepts which stand in a certain similarity relation, e.g. in that they
play similar roles in their respective mental lives. Here one might take
a leaf out of the book of metaphysicians who want to avoid universals
by relying on particularized properties or ‘tropes’. Rather than Anne
and Sarah instantiating a universal which is strictly identical in the
two cases—believing that dogs bark—Anne’s and Sarah’s respective
believings that dogs bark merely stand in a certain similarity relation.
In the current debate about universals the crucial question at this
juncture is whether this similarity relation presupposes a universal
property after all. Fortunately, we do not have to decide this
complex issue here. For as we shall see in the next section, Fodor
himself explicitly rejects the suggestion that different individuals
only have similar rather than numerically identical concepts, and
on the basis of considerations that are central to RTM.38 He
thereby commits himself to the idea that concepts are objects that
can be shared by different individuals, an idea which is incompati-
ble with insisting that they are particulars unique to each
individual.
38 Furthermore, even if the opponents of universals are right, their con-
ception of particularized properties may be cold comfort for RTM.
Consider ﬁrst the reaction of a realist about universals to our particular
example: if the two believings in the respective heads of Anne and Sarah
resemble each other in their role or function (rather than their owner or
their spatio-temporal location), then they must still have the same role or
function, that is, fall under a universal. Their opponents resist the introduc-
tion of such a universal by insisting that similarity is a primitive concept. But
even if similarity is primitive, i.e. a concept which cannot be further
explained, it prima facie remains similarity in a certain respect. As a result
opponents of universals like Heil (From an Ontological Point of View
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), ch. 14) are driven to a further contention:
while objects are similar or dissimilar in certain respects, this does not hold
for (particularized) properties. Whatever the merits of this further move,
however, it takes us beyond the board on which the debate of this paper is
being played out. For the mental particulars of RTM are precisely objects
rather than properties in Heil’s sense.
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4. Representations or Things Represented?
Even if Fodor owned up to the consequence that shareable concepts
are not particulars, his position would still suffer from incoherence.
Very roughly, concepts are constituents of mental states. Thus,
for example, believing that cats are animals is a paradigmatic
mental state, and the concept ANIMAL is a constituent of the
belief that cats are animals. . .mental states and processes are typi-
cally species of relations tomental representations, of which latter
concepts are typically the parts.39
Nothing in Fodor’s writings indicates that he distinguishes constitu-
ents from parts. In that case, however, it is difﬁcult to see how he can
avoid inconsistency. On the one hand, concepts are supposed to be
constituents/parts of mental states and processes, which in turn are
declared to be relations to mental representations. On the other
hand, concepts are supposed to be constituents/parts of the mental
representations themselves.
It is doubtful that there is any case of a thing being both part of a
relation and part of one of the relata of that same relation. Superﬁcial
appearances notwithstanding, Fodor cannot restore consistency here
by adopting a set-theoretic account of relations, even if, for the sake of
argument, we assume the latter to be correct and to be compatible
with his overall position. The set-theoretic account identiﬁes a
relation with a set of ordered n-tuples; but although the relata are
elements of those n-tuples, the parts or components of the relation
itself are the n-tuples rather than the relata. In any event, it is hard
to make sense of the above quote in the context of RTM. For it
commits Fodor to the untenable idea that when Anne believes that
dogs bark the concept DOG is both a part of what she has in her
belief-box—i.e. of the Mentalese token-sentence DOGS BARK—
and of the relation ‘x has . . . in x’s belief-box’.
The former is Fodor’s considered position: ‘concepts are the con-
stituents of thoughts’.40, rather than of states or processes of thinking
thoughts. But that position revolves around a more insidious oscil-
lation between subjective and objective categories, in particular the
realm of signs and the realm of what signs signify. Fodor continues:
I’ll use ‘thoughts’ as my cover term for the mental represen-
tations which, according to RTM, express the propositions that
39 Concepts. . .op. cit. note 7, 6.
40 Concepts. . . op. cit. note 7, 25.
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are the objects of propositional attitudes. Thus, a belief that it
will rain and a hope that it will rain share a thought, as well as
a proposition which that thought expresses. For present pur-
poses, it will do to think of thoughts as mental representations
analogous to closed sentences, and concepts as mental represen-
tations analogous to the corresponding open ones.41
According to Fodor, Anne and Sarah do not stand directly in a
relation of believing to the proposition that dogs bark. Rather, they
stand in a relation to tokens of the thought or Mentalese type-
sentence DOGS BARK; and that thought expresses the proposition,
it ‘means that’ Dogs bark.42 By the same lights, the concept DOG is
a Mentalese type-word which has the property being human as its
meaning.
At the same time, Fodor also suggests that ‘word meanings just are
concepts’.43 Perhaps the tension is merely apparent, in that concepts
are supposed to be both the meanings of the words of public languages
and words of a mental language that mean properties. Yet Fodor
nowhere indicates that this is what he has in mind. Worse still, one
passage strongly suggests something more sinister. Fodor insists
that we must recognize ‘mental representations that express concepts’,
i.e. that concepts are meanings of mental rather than public
symbols.44 Accordingly he is committed to the inconsistent idea
that concepts are both mental words and the meanings of those very
same words.45
This immediate inconsistency could be avoided by abandoning the
second claim, according to which concepts are meanings. But a viable
overall position emerges only by dropping the ﬁrst claim and treating
concepts as components of the contents of propositional attitudes,
parts of what we think (believe, desire, etc.) rather than parts of rep-
resentations that express or mean what we think.46 For it is central
41 Ibid.
42 See Fodor, Psychosemantics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987),
17.
43 Concepts. . . op. cit. note 7, 2.
44 Hume Variations, op. cit. note 2, 13.
45 Consistency cannot be restored by pleading that the ﬁrst claim refers
to concept-tokens and the second to concept-types. For sign-types are not
the contents or meanings of sign-tokens. The token ‘dog’, for instance,
does not mean or express the sign type ‘dog’, it instantiates that type.
What could mean the sign type are signs like ‘“dog”’ or ‘the word “dog”’.
46 Like many contemporaries, Fodor equates meaning and content, e.g.
when he describes believing that p as standing in a computational relation to
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to Fodor’s case for the shareability of concepts that they should be
components of the contents of propositional attitudes. His theory
of concepts is supposed to explain the possibility of psychological
explanations which are both intentional and ‘nomic’; that is to say,
they invoke general law-like connections between propositional atti-
tudes. Such explanations require ‘covering generalizations’ about
people who believe or intend that such-and-such, etc. As a result,
RTM can underwrite psychological explanations of the required
general kind only to the extent to which ‘mental contents are sup-
posed to be shared. If everybody else’s concept WATER is different
frommine, then it is literally true that only I have ever wanted a drink
of water, and that the intentional generalization “Thirsty people seek
water” applies only to me’.47
Intentional explanation presupposes ‘a robust notion of content iden-
tity’, which is tied to a robust notion of concept identity: belief con-
tents and their component concepts are literally shared, rather than
merely similar. This means that Fodor is absolutely right to accept
shareability as a non-negotiable constraint. The only way RTM
could resist the Fregean argument is by demonstrating it to be
invalid, and that path has been blocked in the last section. It also
means that Fodor is committed to the idea that concepts are com-
ponents of propositional contents. For he insists that concepts are
shared because people can literally believe the same. But what
people believe is the propositional content of their beliefs.
It is not just that Fodor’s speciﬁc argument for shareability
requires that concepts be parts of what we think rather than of
representations, of mental sentences which express what we think.
a mental representation that ‘means that’ p. In my view, this equation is
untenable. A proposition, propositional content or thought is something
that is or could be said or believed—a sayable or thinkable. It is something
expressed or conveyed by the use of a sentence, not the meaning of a sen-
tence. Unlike the meaning of a sentence, what is said (believed, etc.) can
be true or false, implausible or exaggerated (R. Cartwright, ‘Propositions’,
in his Philosophical Essays (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), 33–53;
A. White, Truth (London: Macmillan, 1970), 14; W. Ku¨nne, Conceptions
of Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 368–72). Furthermore,
far from being identical with sentence-meanings, what is said on a particular
occasion depends on sentence-meaning and context of utterance. In the
present context, however, the difference can be ignored. The important
point is that concepts are situated not at the level of signs but at the level
of what signs mean or have as content when they are used.
47 Concepts. . .op. cit. note 7, 29; see 7.
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The alternative assumption simply cannot account for shareability.
Peacocke points out that ‘It is possible for one and the same
concept to receive different mental representations in different indi-
viduals’.48 And according to Rey, even mental representation types
need no more be shared between individuals that entertain the
same thought than the type words need to be shared in sentences of
public languages that express the same proposition.
One person might express the concept [city] by the word ‘city’,
another by the world ‘ville’; still another by a mental image of
bustling boulevards; but, for all that, they might have the same
concept [city]; one could believe and another doubt that cities
are healthy places to live.49
Laurence andMargolis try to rebut this argument on two grounds.
First, they deny that different types of mental representations can
express the same concept, since they ‘will have substantially different
inferential roles’. Secondly, even if different types of internal rep-
resentations could express the same concept this would raise ‘no dif-
ﬁculties for the view that concepts are mental representations’:
If two ormore different representations of different types express
the same concept, then, of course, that concept cannot be ident-
iﬁed with one or the other of these two types. But there is no
reason why the concept shouldn’t be identiﬁed with a broader
more encompassing type—one that has the mental represen-
tations of these other two types among its tokens. Just as particu-
lar Persian cats can be cats alongside Siamese cats and tabbies, so
tokens of different types of representation can all be instances of a
broader representation type.50
This response betokens a misunderstanding of the type/token dis-
tinction. Persian and Siamese cats both instantiate the kind cat or
the property of being a cat. But there is no symbol or representation
type of which both ‘city’ and ‘ville’ are tokens. Of course, they have
something in common. Yet it has nothing to do with either the typo-
graphic level at which type-words in public languages are individu-
ated or the syntactic computational level at which type-words in
Mentalese are supposed to be individuated. It lies rather at the
48 A Study of Concepts (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992), 3.
49 ‘Concepts’, in S. Guttenplan (ed.), ACompanion to the Philosophy of
Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 186; see also. S. Schiffer, ‘Lessons in
Mentalese’, Times Literary Supplement (26.06. 1998), 15.
50 ‘Concepts and Cognitive Science’, op. cit. note 30, 76.
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semantic level: both mean the same, they represent the same kind of
thing.51
One might protest that neither Rey’s passage nor the response by
Laurence and Margolis really engage with RTM, at least in the
version Fodor advocates. According to the language of thought
hypothesis, anyone who thinks that cities are crowded must ipso
facto have a Mentalese sentence of the type CITIES ARE
CROWDED in her belief-box, irrespective of what images or
words from natural languages may cross her mind.
Far from defusing the more general objection, however, this
protest merely suggests that the language of thought hypothesis
with its type/token distinction taken from semiotics is inapposite in
the case of thought. Even if computationally individuated patterns
of neural ﬁring can be symbolic representations52 they will not have
to be shared by people entertaining the same thought. Fodor’s rep-
resentation types are individuated not typographically, but through
their syntax, through how they are cognitively processed. Yet A
and B may have one and the same belief, and this belief may
involve one and the same concept, without there being anything
that is processed in the same way in both. If you associate the term
‘grandmother’ with an image of your grandmother and I associate
it with the ﬁrst line of Brahms’ Lullaby, this is no bar to our expres-
sing the same concept by it. Similarly, if, for the sake of exempliﬁca-
tion, we accept the popular idea that neural networks present cities
pictorially and digital computers present them symbolically, it is
clear that the representations cannot be processed in the same way;
yet this is no bar to them expressing the same concept. Note,
ﬁnally, that believing cities are crowded can lead to different con-
clusions and actions inA andB. Amay conclude that cities are desir-
able places and seek to live in them, while B may draw the opposite
conclusions. There is no reason why one and the same concept
should not play slightly different roles in the thinking of different
individuals.
51 To be sure, in aesthetics we encounter an extension of the semiotic
distinction whichmight accommodate Laurence andMargolis. It treats a lit-
erary work such as Anna Karenina as a type, of which, e.g. Solzhenitsyn,
Bloom and I possess different tokens, notwithstanding the fact that these
tokens are spelled differently. But this terminological extension of the
notion of a type in noway alters the crucial fact: what is common to the envi-
saged representations of cities lies at the semantic rather than the typographic
or syntactic level.
52 Contrary to H-J. Glock, ‘Neural Representationalism’, Facta
Philosophica 5 (2003), 105–29.
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Laurence and Margolis are right to insist that one and the same
concept cannot play different inferential roles in the cognition of
different individuals. But, their second response to Rey notwith-
standing, this kind of equivalence is ensured in the case of ‘city’
and ‘ville’. That x is densely populated, for instance, follows
equally from the fact that x satisﬁes ‘city’ and that x satisﬁes ‘ville’.
The problem for RTM is that the roles that need to be shared
between representations to ensure sameness of concepts are, trivially,
those which are constitutive of conceptual content. This not only con-
tradicts Fodor’s adamant rejection of any kind of analytic/synthetic
distinction, it also makes the sharing of concepts once more depen-
dent on the semantic level of meaning or content.
On a coherent account that preserves the connection between con-
cepts and shared thoughts (in the sense of thinking the same content),
a concept is neither a token- nor a type- sign. Rather, it is what is sig-
niﬁed or expressed by such signs. It is central to RTM that ‘concepts
are symbols’.53 Yet concepts cannot themselves be symbols (whether
mental or public), since they are among the kinds of things which
symbols represent.54 In a Teutonic vein, you might speak of
‘Frege’s Revenge’.55 In an American vein, you might exclaim: ‘Any
way you cut up the pie, concepts ain’t in the head!’.
53 Concepts. . .op. cit. note 7, 28.
54 I deliberately leave open the precise nature of this semantic relation of
representing. My preference is to adopt Ku¨nne’s (Conceptions of Truth, op.
cit. note 48, ch. 1) distinction between application, signiﬁcation and
expression: The concept-word ‘dog’ applies to dogs, signiﬁes the property
of being a dog, and expresses the concept of being a dog. Of course there
are alternatives to this terminology, and there may be superior accounts of
concept-words. But this does not affect my point against RTM, namely
that concepts are not themselves symbolic representations, but something
which stands in a semantic relation to such representations.
55 At the same time, the Fregean position preserves a connection
between concepts and representation. Concepts are neither symbols nor
subjective representations of a different (e.g. iconic) kind, but they are
‘modes of presentation’, i.e. ways in which different subjects can think of
something. This opens up the possibility of treating concepts both as
things represented—namely things expressed by concept-words—and as
representations—namely ways of presenting properties (see W. Ku¨nne,
‘Properties in Abundance’, in P. F. Strawson and A. Chakrabarti (eds.),
Universals, Concepts and Qualities (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 263-6. My
criticism of RTM does not rule out this option. Alas, it is difﬁcult to spell
out, especially if one seeks to avoid both the Scylla of subjectivism and
the Charybdis of Platonist myths about a ‘third realm’.
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Aversion of RTMwhich takes these lessons on board will still be a
representationalist model of the mind in general and of conceptual
thinking in particular. Yet it will no longer constitute a genuinely
subjectivist position about concepts. RTM’s case against objectivism
has evaporated, and its case against concept pragmatism has to be
re-jigged as follows: we entertain conceptual thoughts not by exercis-
ing an ability, but through the occurrence of neural tokenings of
symbolic types; and we share a conceptual thought if those types
have the same meaning or content. This case ought to be resisted,
in my view. In that context one should also try to provide an
account of the shareability of concepts which avoids both subjecti-
vism and the Platonism of Frege’s own brand of objectivism. The
purpose of this paper was more modest, namely to rehabilitate the
Fregean argument against the idea that concepts are mental
particulars.56
University of Zu¨rich
56 For comments I should like to thank Peter Hacker, John Hyman,
Wolfgang Ku¨nne, Christian Nimtz, Oliver Petersen and Mark Textor, as
well as audiences at Reading, Edinburgh, Leeds, Berlin, Bern, Geneva,
Essen and Konstanz. I am particularly grateful to Javier Kalhat for sugges-
tions and editorial help.
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